PAUL KENNEDY
2/3/03

EDITORS: We are releasing this Paul Kennedy early in light of its timeliness and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's scheduled talk at the United Nations on Wednesday.

INSTEAD OF BOMBING SADDAM, WHY NOT TRY “LILLIPUTING” HIM?
There exists a third option between war and appeasement
By Paul Kennedy

To “Lilliput” someone is not, I think, a term that appears in any English-language dictionary, but its meaning is fairly clear. It derives from one of the most famous adventure tales of all time. When Jonathan Swift’s hapless hero Gulliver is washed up on the shore of the mysterious island of Lilliput, he wakes to find his arms and legs, and even his hair, have been bound by ropes, so that he is unable to rise. All he can do is look helplessly upward, seeing nothing but the sky.

I thought of Gulliver’s fate this past weekend because at various events -- after Sunday Mass, at a wedding anniversary -- I was pressed time and again by well-meaning and worried Americans with a single question, “Is there anything that can be done to avoid a war?” None of them holds that Saddam’s regime is anything other than a very evil one, or assert that he can be ignored. All are deeply patriotic. But they are also worried at signs that this country is about to embark upon a military crusade that may result in unintended consequences, and they are desperate to learn of some middle way between war and appeasement. So I offered them what might be called “the Lilliputian solution,” a graceless term, but one to the point. Here it is:

Imagine that a group of Security Council members propose a new set of resolutions regarding the crisis, roughly on the following lines:

“Resolved that:

“Considering the evidence that Iraq has not fully and openly complied with U.N. Security Council resolution 1441, the Council resolves to request the International Atomic Energy Authority forthwith to (ITALIC) quintuple (END ITALIC) the number of inspection teams; and to establish a national inspection headquarters in Baghdad and regional inspection offices until such time as the Council judges them to be unnecessary. The Council further requires that the government of Iraq permit the inspections to occur without hindrance, wherever and whenever the IAEA teams judge appropriate, and reaffirms the language of Resolution 1441 should Iraq fail to comply.

“Considering the many reports of human rights abuses in Iraq, the Council requests the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, and all other bodies which in the opinion of the UNHCR can contribute to this mission, to establish in Baghdad a national office, along with an appropriate number of regional offices in the rest of Iraq, with a view to investigating and reporting all and any human rights abuses that have occurred or may be occurring; and that the teams and offices involved in this mission be accorded by the government of Iraq the same freedom of movement and inspection as those accorded to the IAEA inspectorate.

“Considering the many reports of malnutrition among the women and children of Iraq, the Council requests the U.N. Development Programme forthwith to coordinate with UNICEF, with the U.N. Food Programme and with all other appropriate U.N. bodies that report to the General Assembly, with a view to establishing a network of relief offices for the distribution of food and medical supplies throughout Iraq, and later for agricultural and related development programmes; that the UNDP be encouraged to invite the World Bank to contribute its expertise; and also to invite and supervise appropriate non-governmental organizations, charities and church groups offering expert assistance in this mission, as it deems fit. And, further, that all such teams and offices be accorded by the Government of Iraq the same freedom of movement and operation as those of the IAEA.

“Considering the many reports of hazardous environmental conditions in Iraq, the Council requests the U.N. Environmental Programme forthwith to prepare and enact a nationwide inspection of all and any environmentally dangerous sites and projects, as well as of badly affected areas; and, to the same end, to establish a national office in Baghdad and such regional offices as may be deemed necessary; and, further to that end, to invite and work with all and any appropriate international environmental monitoring bodies, scientific associations and NGOs that can bring expertise to this mission. And, further, that all such teams and offices and inspections be accorded by the Government of Iraq the same freedom of movement and operation as those accorded to the IAEA.

“Considering the importance of returning Iraq to the international community and to repairing its economy, the Council invites the International Monetary Fund to establish a team of experts to investigate and prepare a report on the complete economic and social condition of Iraq; to considering requesting the World Bank, the UNDP and other appropriate U.N. bodies to assist in this investigation and report; and to work closely with all appropriate Iraqi governmental ministries, who are required by this resolution to offer all requested data, and to accord this IMF Mission the same freedom of movement , inspection and operation as those accorded to the IAEA.

“Any and all breaches of these freedoms of inspection and movement by members of U.N. and related bodies operating in Iraq shall be immediately reported by the agency responsible to the Secretary-General, who is charged with bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council forthwith, with a view to implementing the measures authorized in Resolution 1441.

“Finally, the Council requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the General Assembly and all the U.N. and specialized agencies mentioned above, to compose a collective budget, and to assess Members’ contributions according the formulae of the regular U.N. budget.”

Of course the U.N.’s own expert drafters and senior diplomats would find many technical faults in the above text. But the overall idea merits serious consideration. I was inclined to go further and insert a clause requesting the Secretary-General’s Office to prepare a plan for free and open elections, but until the various Iraqi parties request such help, that would go against Article 2, 7 of the Charter and make the Chinese very uneasy about too great an intervention in the affairs of a member. Still, it is hard to see Beijing vetoing Security Council resolutions that call for sending UNICEF or the UNDP to help the women and children of Iraq.

Were this to be implemented, and swiftly, the nasty regime of the “Gulliver” of Baghdad would be tied down by an unbelievable number of ropes and knots, with personnel from U.N. agencies and other international organizations setting up offices in the capital and literally crisscrossing the country to regional offices, inspection sites and meetings with local officials, educators, scientists, and tribal representatives.

It would be inconceivable to imagine that under such circumstances a tied-down Saddam could restart any hidden programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

It would be impossible for him to claim that women and children were starving.

It would difficult to maintain hideous abuses of human rights upon the regime’s opponents if teams of UNHCR inspectors were abroad in the land.

It would be impossible to maintain the veil of secrecy over the regime’s finances if an IMF team could request and see everything (including capital flows for arms purchases).

Moreover, this is not a quick-in-and-out operation. It could be conducted for years if necessary, and at a cost well below that of a military campaign against Baghdad.

By doing this, the world community would totally and imaginatively call Saddam’s bluff. In fact, rather like Gulliver himself in another story, Saddam would be between the devil and the deep blue sea. He could order his officials and people to comply fully and openly, and without exception, with all of the U.N. teams -- which would be perfectly delightful since the Iraqi people would at last be to speak and operate without fear. Observing the benefits of being returned to the world community, they would be likely soon to call for free elections; and if there were such, one doubts that Saddam would get the 99 percent vote he received last year. If, in fact, U.S. hawks are so right and Saddam is unpopular (but feared), then we would have “regime change” all right, but one carried out peacefully and not by the 101st Airborne Division. What could be more congenial -- except to those who truly want a war?

Saddam could, of course, refuse a new Security Council resolution or, as a variant of that, produce so many violations that were then reported back to New York that it would be clear that he was in non-compliance. In that case, a U.N. peace-enforcement operation, delegated to the United States to lead and organize, would be within its rights to carry out whatever military actions its commanders deemed necessary -- in other words, to implement the sort of military operation that is being finalized right now.

But there would be a world of difference. Saddam would have lost all world support. Wavering neutrals like Germany, Saudi Arabia and the others would be relieved. France, Russia and China would be pleased that the status of the Security Council had been confirmed. Tony Blair would be off the hook at home. Finally, I would guess that concerned Americans who ask, “What can be done to deal with Saddam, but without a rush to war?” would sleep happier in their beds.

Is such a “Lilliputian Solution” too late? Perhaps. But perhaps not. It will all depend on our political leaders -- and the democracies that vote them into power -- to make that decision. But they haven’t much time.

Paul Kennedy is the Dilworth Professor of History at Yale University, and the author/editor of 15 books, including “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.”
© Tribune Media Services International. For immediate release (Distributed 2/3/03)
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